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A variety of uncertainties make defense planning a difficult task even under the 
best of circumstances.  The more varied threat environment in the post-Cold War era, the 
high price of replacing aging weapon systems and other uncertainties make contemporary 
planning even more problematic.  There is a clear need for more and better tools to 
address the uncertain variables in the planning equation. 
 This study explores such tools.  It deals explicitly with two levels of uncertainty.  
The first level is captured with the method of scenarios (from Peter Schwartz).  The 
second level is the “usual” variability of economic affairs within each scenario.  This 
second level is captured using standard econometric and simulation methods.  The benefit 
of this approach is mainly insights for planners – primarily into the sources of uncertainty 
and their effects (as opposed to point estimates). 
The People’s Republic of China (2001-2021) is offered as an illustrative exercise.  
Within that case, we address uncertainty among three scenarios for China’s economic 
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National security and economic policy are inextricably linked.  To secure 
its existence in the international system, a state must make strategic 
choices in both peace and war.  To implement a strategy, the state must 
have access to adequate economic resources.  Ultimately it is impossible 
to separate economic power from political power.  Whatever enhances the 
commercial, financial and industrial power of a state increases the military 
potential of that state. 
Mackubin Owens, The Political Economy of National Defense  
“Planning is the replacement of uncertainty with error” 
 Professor Patrick Parker 
 
A.   BACKGROUND 
Strategic planning for national defense is an extremely controversial topic about 
which there are many and vastly different schools of thought and methodologies.  
Difficulties inherent to defense decision making include uncertainties about the enemy, 
the economy, technology and future events.  Adding to these difficulties is the fact that 
bringing new weapons systems from concept to operational duty can take well over a 
decade.1  As time to operational fielding has increased, the price of weapons systems has 
grown 5-7% per year.   While this inflation brought increased capabilities of the systems, 
the escalation in an era where spending on national defense has decreased in both actual 
and real terms, has caused a crises situation for defense planners. The result is that the 
present US military force simply cannot be recapitalized at a realistic price. 
As a result, precise strategic planning is more important than ever.  The 
consequences of inaccurate planning assumptions might be obsolete, expensive, 
ineffective systems.  The implications of failure and the constrained fiscal environment 
                                                 
1 The initial conceptualization of the Aegis weapons system occurred in 1963 and it was not deployed 
operationally until 1981 
2 
make national defense decision-making one of the most complex and vital tasks that our 
nation’s leaders face.    
The US defense planning process has been relatively stable since the early 1960’s 
when the Planning Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) was instituted.  There 
are multiple points of access to the process from the President, Congress and the Armed 
Forces in this system.  One criticism of the defense procurement system is that the PPBS 
and the Congressional Budget Process are notoriously shortsighted and partisan.  This is 
despite the 5 to 6 year planning horizon in the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP).  
Compounding the situation is that several major stakeholders have conflicting interests 
including “turf” battles for mission areas amongst the services and “pork” for constituents 
of politicians.    
Whether or not the current system is set up to actually allow strategic thinking far 
enough in the future to react to emerging trends is debatable.  One thing that is certain 
however is that there needs to be a coherent process that can provide an unbiased focus 
on strategic planning.  Use of the best available qualitative and quantitative management 
tools should be used to focus on key driving issues.  This thesis will attempt to tackle one 
of the most important and unpredictable factors, which influence the future strategic 
planning terrain.  That issue is the economy.      
Economics studies allocation of scarce resources.  Planning for national defense is 
an excellent illustration.  At the national level the correct balance between public and 
private sector spending must be struck so that security is maintained while growth 
encouraged.  This problem is usually resolved with reference to the relative percentage of 
GDP to be spent on defense.  This percentage has lessened in recent years due to the 
increase of “non-discretionary” spending as a percentage of the total expenditures and 
growth of the national economy while the threat has diminished.   
Given the importance of the economic dimension to planning future defense force 
structures, a means of evaluating alternate scenarios is necessary.   Peter Schwartz is a 
leading proponent of scenario building methodologies for the public and private sector.  
His guidance has allowed his clients to gain crucial insight into a variety of emerging 
situations by examining these scenarios.  His general technique is to identify crucial 
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issues and the factors that affect them.  Once these factors have been sized up, models 
can be developed and conceptual thought about the potential outcomes can be fleshed 
out.  (Schwartz, 1991) 
Economic forecasting is inherently inaccurate.  While complex models have been 
proposed by some extremely bright minds, no one has been consistently accurate in their 
predictions.  An apropos ancient Arab proverb states, “He who predicts the future lies 
even if he tells the truth.”  Managers and planners who use standard economic forecasts 
as fact are missing the point.  Correct focus is to identify the factors that are part of 
growth and productivity changes, and to evaluate them in the context of alternate 
scenarios.  Armed with these insights, the planner is then prepared for the eventuality that 
events do not unfold as expected.   
This thesis is based on that thought.  Economists have developed several models 
of economic growth.  These models usually contain two basic categories of variables.  
The first is the growth rate of inputs and the second is rate of growth in output relative to 
growth of the inputs.  The resultant is a point estimate that is highly sensitive to 
individual variable shifts.  A crux of this research is to examine the uncertainties of these 
variables.  That is, what happens to growth if the factors change in ways other than 
standard models assume?   
Within scenarios, Monte Carlo simulation is a technique that has become quite 
accessible to business leaders for evaluation of potential risk with alternative policies.  
The technique uses random number generators and statistical distributions that can be 
derived from management assessments of a situation or from historical data.  The 
outcome from the model is then a distribution of possible outcomes.  The policy maker 
can evaluate risks by potential impact and relative probability of occurrence and make 
policy choices accordingly.   
This thesis will propose a comprehensive planning methodology that will 
incorporate elements of scenario development, risk management, econometric modeling 
and Monte Carlo Simulation to capture insights about future GDP growth and the 
implications for defense planners.  A potential rival nation will be utilized to demonstrate 
the method with real world data and alternative scenarios. 
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B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this research is to examine the effects of uncertainty in economic 
forecasting as a key variable in national defense decision-making.  The relative strength 
of our own economy and that of potential enemies determines the ability of potential 
competitor nations to field an effective and modern armed force.  Given the importance 
of this factor and the large degree of uncertainty surrounding economic forecasts, a sound 
methodology must be developed which considers a broad range of potential futures 
scenarios and quantifies the risks of making decisions within these scenarios.  This thesis 
will seek to develop such a model and illustrate its use by applying it to a real world 
nation.   
C. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
A review some of the important concepts of risk management, modeling and 
stochastic simulation, macroeconomic production theory and econometric modeling will 
be conducted.  Suggestions for a comprehensive tool to evaluate alternative scenarios of 
future economies using a combination of several methodologies will be presented. 
The model that will be introduced will be simple enough to use in a standard 
spreadsheet with a Monte Carlo Simulation plug in (such as Crystal Ball) yet robust 
enough to provide detailed insight into the decisions to be made.  A Bayesian analysis 
will also be suggested for calibrating the model as new observations arise. 
D. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
The study will be organized by first introducing the key concepts in the early 
chapters and then presenting a cohesive model in detail.  After this model is adequately 
articulated it will be applied to the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) using actual 
historical data and introducing assumptions in the form of data to model other scenarios.  
Insights that result from this analysis will be collected and suggestions for future research 




II. RISK MANAGEMENT AND STRATEGIC PLANNING 
FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE          
Managing risk is a central element of the defense strategy.  It involves 
balancing the demands of the present against preparations for the future 
consistent with the strategies priorities…  over the past 60 years, the 
United states has spent an average of 8 percent on the Gross Domestic 
Product on defense; in 2001, 2.9% of the GDP was spent on defense.  The 
tendency to reduce spending in periods with no clear or well-defined 
threat has the potential effect of creating risks by avoiding or delaying 
investment in the force. 
Quadrennial Defense Review Report.  2001 
 
A.   REVIEW OF RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESSES 
Uncertainty about a situation can be considered risk.  Risk in its most basic 
definition is “the possibility of suffering harm or loss; danger.” (www.dictionary.com) 
The implications of this definition for national defense are obvious.  The problem for 
national defense decision makers is to manage the array of possible risks, and to craft a 
flexible and responsive force. 
The continuum of risks that affect military establishments runs the gambit from 
extreme catastrophic events such as an attack by weapons of mass destruction to 
relatively minor peacekeeping incidents that characterized the security environment of 
the 1990’s.  Relative probabilities of these events and the associated costs must be 
assessed to determine where resources should be allocated to minimize expected harm.    
While risk is inherent in any defense problem, an honest effort to assess costs and 
benefits of alternative courses of action is important to planning for the future. 
Risk management is a technique that organizations use to evaluate vulnerabilities 
and think about outcomes.  This technique implemented in many variants is a key 
component of strategic planning.  Risk assessment takes place at several levels of the 
national defense resource allocation process.  Risk management is factored into the PPBS 
process, as requirements are generated in the planning phase.   
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B.   RISK MANAGEMENT IN CURRENT DOD PLANNING PROCESSES 
The risk management approach of the DOD resource allocation process differs 
from other discretionary budgetary areas where an incremental approach is usually taken.   
Given the crucial nature of defense there is generally more oversight to defense decisions 
throughout the process than on other programs where funding and direction escape 
review on a yearly basis.  Cuts in funding to defense increase the risk assumed.  This risk 
must be acceptable to the overall guidance from the executive branch and considered 
carefully.   
 The threat and vision for defense is defined and articulated through the planning 
stage of the PPBS.  Since no (formal) fiscal constraint exists until SECDEF’s Defense 
Planning Guidance (DPG) is released.   The Programming phase of the process defines, 
schedules and allocates resources to counter the proposed threat.   Finally, the budgeting 
phase puts dollars to the defense priorities after several rounds of debate.   
Documents such as the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and Joint Vision 
2020, and the National Military Strategy are also examples of formalized strategic 
planning.  These documents look to the future and analyze trends and possible risks.  
From these visions, guidance is provided for planning forces and establishing doctrine to 
counter anticipated threats.  The Program Objectives Memorandum (POM) is the primary 
programming document that each service generates.  It represents the six-year plan for 
allocating resources and is largely influenced by the DPG.  The Congressional process 
balances these DOD strategic plans where many of the same issues are assessed at the 
Authorization and Appropriations committees. 
It is clear that the current military planning system does have mechanisms that 
assess risk and compel strategic planning.  One critical disconnect however is the 
planning horizon versus the time it takes to operationally field a weapons system.  While 
there are mechanisms of longer range planning in such places as the Office of Net 
Assessment, the outermost reach of the formal process is the 6-year focus of the POM.  
What are the potential risks that are exposed in the meantime?  Is there a way to 
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minimize or at least plan for risks beyond this timeframe?   Peter Schwartz’s scenario 
based methodologies are designed to answer these questions. 
C.    INTRODUCTION OF SCENARIO BASED STRATEGIC PLANNING 
Scenarios are alternative environments in which today’s decisions can be 
played out.  They are not predictions.  Nor are they strategies.  Instead 
they are descriptions of different futures specifically designed to highlight 
the risks and opportunities involved in specific strategic issues 
     (Ogilvy,  Schwartz p.79) 
Scenario building and evaluation is a powerful way to think critically about the 
future.  Author and consultant Peter Schwartz describes this process in his work, The Art 
of the Long View.  His contention is that "scenarios are not predictions" but rather 
outcomes that reflect alternative driving forces.  He describes the utility of this technique 
in the following way: "scenarios are . . . the most powerful vehicles . . . for challenging 
our 'mental models' about the world and lifting the 'blinders' that limit our creativity and 
resourcefulness.”  (Schwartz, 1991 p. xv) 
Schwartz argues that scenarios should be used as informal simulations to facilitate 
thinking more concretely and accurately about what might come next.  Hopefully these 
give courses of action that are good regardless of which future actually occurs.  Such 
scenarios are like projected script plots for a movie, and help develop "memories of the 
future".    (Schwartz, 1991 p. 32) 
Schwartz then describes how scenarios become strategies. This evolves from the 
use of knowledge and intuition of the external environment, combined with the internal 
vision, culture, and competencies of the organization itself.  He gives reasons for 
examining five categories of driving forces of the future, which include society, 
technology, economics, politics, and the natural environment.  Within these areas his 
general approach is to examine one scenario that is better than the current direction, one 
worse, and one different.  Moreover, he suggests the following eight steps for developing 
scenarios that are helpful for strategic planners: 
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1. Identify focal issue or decision 
2. Identify key forces in the local environment 
3. Identify driving forces 
4. Rank these by importance and uncertainty 
5. Select scenario logics 
6. Flesh out the scenarios 
7. Determine implications 
8. Select leading indicators and signposts 
These steps lead the planner down a road where critical insights can be gained, 
context developed and mind frames developed and prepared for action.  (Schwartz, 1991) 
This approach is especially valuable to national defense planning.  The nature of 
assessing national security threats even in the short run since the end of the cold war is 
notoriously difficult.  Uncertainty, according to Schwartz is the primary driver for 
evaluating these scenarios.  The events that have unfolded since the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001 provide an illustration.  Since the fall of the Soviet Union, US 
defense planners have argued vehemently about the direction and architecture of the 
armed forces.  Many would argue that the lack of certainty of potential foes has resulted 
in a situation where the armed forces continue to build to a cold war style two-MRC 
(major regional conflict) style war.  Pundits have long decried peacetime military leaders 
of having a “last war” mentality.  With better insight provided by this detailed scenario 
building methodology, we might have lessened vulnerabilities exploited by the recent 
terrorist attacks.
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III.  RISK ANALYSIS USING SPREADSHEET MODELING AND 
MONTE CARLO SIMULATION  
 
A.   INTRODUCTION 
Modern spreadsheets such as Microsoft Excel have the capacity to provide 
accurate record keeping, data collection and dissemination.  They also have the ability to 
model situations that are important to decision makers with sufficient fidelity to be 
useful.  These models reflect the postulated mathematical relationships between decision 
variables, and can produce results that can yield critical insights. 
B.   SPREADSHEET SCENARIO MODELING 
Decision makers of necessity rely heavily on spreadsheet models to evaluate a 
variety of potential scenarios.  The models are populated with known variables and their 
mathematical relationships.  For each variable there is a degree of uncertainty.  
Traditionally, spreadsheet analysis has tried to capture this uncertainty in one of three 
ways: point estimates, range estimates, and what-if scenarios. 
Point estimates utilize most likely values (mode) for uncertain variables.  While 
these estimates are simple and commonly used, their result can be misleading.  For 
example, crossing a river with an average depth of three feet is a tenuous proposition.  
Similarly, if it takes you an average of 25 minutes to get to the airport, leaving 25 
minutes before your flight takes off will find you missing your plane half the time. 
 Range estimates typically calculate three scenarios: the best case, the worst case, 
and the most likely case. These types of estimates show a range of outcomes, but not the 
probability of any of these outcomes.  
What-if scenarios are usually based on the range estimates, and calculate as many 
scenarios as are deemed appropriate.   This scenario-driven approach is somewhat similar 
to the Schwartz methodology.  What is the worst case?  What is the best case?  
Calculating these for each variable becomes a time consuming task but still doesn’t 
provide the probability of achieving any different outcome. 
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C. SPREADSHEET RISK ANALYSIS 
Risk analysis can be performed in several ways, but one method involves building 
a spreadsheet model.  A good spreadsheet model can be very helpful in identifying where 
risk might be, since cells with formulas and cell references identify causal relationships 
among variables.  One of the drawbacks of conventional spreadsheet models is that each 
cell can take only one value at a time.  This limitation prevents a direct investigation of a 
range of values for a cell.  Calculating a range by replacing uncertain values several times 
to see the effect of various values.  Calculating more realistic "what-if" scenarios is the 
same, except it requires changing the spreadsheet even more.  Furthermore, the scenario 
results have to be tracked somewhere.    Simulation with a spreadsheet allows uncertain 
variables to be modeled by defining a cell with a range or a set of values.   
D.   MONTE CARLO SIMULATION 
The word “simulation” refers to any means used to imitate a real-life system, 
especially when other analyses are too complex or too difficult to reproduce analytically.   
Without the aid of simulation, a spreadsheet model will reveal only a point estimate, 
generally the most likely or average outcome.  Spreadsheet risk analysis uses both a 
spreadsheet model and simulation to automatically analyze the effect of varying inputs on 
outputs of the modeled system.  
One type of spreadsheet simulation is “Monte Carlo” simulation, which randomly 
generates values for uncertain variables over and over to explore a model’s consquences.   
The method was named for Monte Carlo, Monaco, where the primary attractions are 
casinos containing games of chance such as roulette wheels, dice, and slot machines.  
Mathematician John von Neumann is credited with its development in conjunction with 
the Manhattan Project in World War II.  With the advent of affordable and rapid 
computing, the technique has been borrowed and refined for a variety of applications 
from the engineering and science fields to business applications.  In addition to being 
able to simulate inventory management and queuing theory it can also be applied to 




E.   HOW MONTE CARLO SIMULATION WORKS 
The random behavior in games of chance is similar to how Monte Carlo 
simulation selects variable values at random to simulate a model.  When a die is rolled, 
only a 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6 will come up, but the result at any roll is unknown.  It's the same 
with the variables that have a known range of values but an uncertain value for any 
particular time or event (e.g. interest rates, skilled-labor availability, capital costs, 
inventory, etc.).  
In a spreadsheet model which uses Monte Carlo Simulation, a probability 
distribution is defined for each uncertain variable (one that has a range of possible 
values).  This information can be based on historical data, known statistical distributions 
(with such factors as means and standard deviations), or other information provided by 
those familiar with the system. 
The type of distribution selected is based on the conditions surrounding variable.  
Typical distribution types include:  
and .   
(From:  Decisioneering Software, 2001) 
While it is possible to add this sort of function to a spreadsheet, entering the equation for 
the respective distribution would be time consuming and difficult to populate with data. 
Plug-in software such as Crystal Ball for Microsoft Excel is readily available where these 
equations are automatically calculated. Crystal Ball can also fit a distribution to any 
historical data available.  
A simulation calculates multiple outcomes of a model by repeatedly sampling 
values from the probability distributions for the uncertain variables and using those 
values for the cell. Crystal Ball simulations can consist of as many trials as desired, 
limited only by the complexity of the model and the computing power available.   
During a single trial, the software randomly selects a value from the defined 
possibilities (the range and shape of the distribution) for each uncertain variable and then 
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recalculates the spreadsheet for the final outcome or forecast.  This forecast cell is 
defined by the modeler and is generally the outcome that is being studied.  After each 
iteration of the model the software records the value and plugs it in to an outcome 
distribution.  During the simulation a graphical histogram of the results, referred to as a 
Frequency Chart, is developed for each forecast. As the number of iterations increases, 
the forecasts stabilize toward a smooth frequency distribution. After the preset number of 
trials is complete, the statistics of the results (such as the mean forecast value) and the 
likelihood of any given outcome are available for viewing and analysis. The example 
below is a forecast for total expected return.  
 
(From: Decisioneering Software, 2001) 
F.  WHAT IS CERTAINTY? 
Certainty is the chance that a particular forecast value would fall within a 
specified range. For example, in the Crystal Ball chart above, the certainty of breaking 
even (results better than $0) is available by entering $ 0 amount as the lower limit. Of the 
5000 trials that were run, 4408 (or 88.16%) of those had a positive total expected return, 
so certainty or confidence of breaking even in this case is 88.16%.  Therefore, the 
forecast results not only show different results for each forecast, but also the probability 
of any value.  This feature allows a complete evaluation of a myriad of “what-if” 
situation. (Decisioneering Software, 2001) 
Other features of Crystal Ball allow the analyst to examine different facets of the 
model.  The Sensitivity Chart allows analysis of the contribution of the assumptions (the 
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uncertain variables) to a forecast, showing which assumptions have the greatest impact 
on that forecast, or what factor is most responsible for the uncertainty of outcomes.     
Sensitivity analysis can provide insight on which decision variables that matter most.  
G.  SUMMARY 
While risks must be taken to succeed in any venture, including national defense, 
blind unassessed risks often lead to costly errors.  The nation is making “you bet your 
country” decisions when planning an armed force.  This technique is one more analytic 
tool to aid defense decision makers by helping assess risks and risk reduction measures. 
The sensitivity analysis feature provides the added benefit of allowing the policy maker 
to focus on variables they can control to best influence the final results.  Each time a 
simulation is performed, a richer understanding of the inherent risks is obtained.  This 
tool fits well within the Schwartz method of scenario building and gives critical insights 
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IV.  MACROECONOMIC THEORY AND FORECASTING 
A.   INTRODUCTION 
“Life is a trap for logicians because it is almost but not quite reasonable.”  
It looks just a little more mathematical and regular than it is.   Its 
exactitude is obvious but its inexactitude is hidden; its wildness lies in 
wait.”   
 
G.K. Chesterton (English writer) 
 
“It is dangerous to make forecasts, especially about the future.” 
    Yogi Berra 
 
Whether or not these statements are understood by those who design complex 
models for predicting the future of the economy is questionable.  There is ample evidence 
that some see these models as a science rather than the art that it is.  An enormous 
amount of time and resources of some the most successful organizations in the country 
have gone into quantitative modeling of future trends and outcomes.  Why is this so if the 
future cannot be predicted with confidence? 
The answer lies in the insights provided by the process.  Schwartz would say 
mental models are improved.  According to his theory of scenario building, several 
“futures” should be examined, including the most likely case, an extremely bad case and 
an optimistic case.  Using this framework in tandem with modern modeling and 
simulation methods can arm decision makers with the tools to rapidly evaluate a broad 
range of possibilities. They can also be changed to reflect current parameters such as 
technology, demographics and geopolitics.   
Additionally, simulation methods allow attachment of statistical likelihoods to 
scenario forecasts and associated conditional probabilities.  The utility of this approach is 
that risk management techniques introduced earlier can be utilized to assess risk.  A 
defense economic example might be that there is a 1 in 10 chance China’s GDP could 
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grow to 11 trillion dollars by 2005.  By seeing this figure plus a relative likelihood of 
alternative possibilities, more informed decisions are possible. 
The correct perspective must be maintained throughout this process however.  
Reliance on modeling outcomes as predictors rather than insight producers can be 
disastrous.  The rapid destruction of the hedge fund Long Term Capital Management in 
the fall of 1998 is a case in point.  This fund traded extensively in derivatives and 
arbitrage with use of heavy leverage.  Their use of computer models developed by the 
crème of academia, including Nobel Prize winners, relied on historical data and 
assumptions.  When Russian debt default triggered the Asian financial crises of the 1997, 
the historical norms of arbitrage trading and bond yields broke down.  In five weeks the 
Long Term Capital’s portfolio imploded under the weight of its leverage.  Massive 
margin calls and elimination of credit with market makers led to losses so massive that 
the US Federal Reserve felt obligated to arrange a bailout to protect the rest of the 
economy.  (Lowenstein, 2000).    
B.   MACROECONOMIC PRODUCTION THEORY 
Economic forecasting has been around since the dawn of the mercantile system.  
Recent advances in computing power and simulation theory have armed economists with 
new tools to test their theories.  This section will examine some of the methods and 
theory used to predict growth.  
These theories attempt to mathematically model growth of an economy by 
quantifying two basic categories.  The first is the growth factor of inputs and the second 
is growth in output relative to the growth of the inputs.  The two main factor inputs are 
capital (K) and Labor (K).   A general form of the equation relates GDP (Q) to an 
autonomous growth factor (A) (or total factor productivity growth) the geometrically 
weighted average of labor and capital in following fashion: 
Q = A K α L (1−α) 
This is the basic form of a production equation and provides a baseline on which 
more sophisticated modeling is based.  (Gordon, 1990, p. 362) 
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C.  REVIEW OF MACROECONOMIC MODELING FOR NATIONAL 
SECURITY DECISION MAKING 
DOD uses the RAND Corporation extensively as a consultant on a variety of 
issues surrounding national defense.  A notable series of RAND reports focus on the 
economy and demographic trends as key drivers of the emerging national security 
environment in the next 15 to 20 years.  The most recent example of this series is Asian 
Economic Trends and Their Security Implications and uses their technique as a 
framework from which to gain insights about possible futures in the Pacific Rim.  Since 
they are generally considered as the paragon of this area of economic research, a review 
of its basic methodology is useful. 
The basic method has four major steps beginning with the estimation of GDP’s 
for various nations based on the Cobb Douglas Production Function.  This estimate is 
combined with demographic predictions to derive GDP per capita.  Military spending as a 
proportion of GDP is then estimated based on historical data.  The final and most tedious 
step involves estimating military capital.  This is calculated by estimating the spent on 
procurement and adding this to the depreciated stockpile of existing equipment.   
This methodology is encapsulated the following mathematical relationships. 
 
Equation (1):   Q  =  e τt L α K (1−α)   
(Cobb Douglass Production Function)        
Where: Q  = Real GDP 
τ = technological rate of change (total factor   
productivity) 
  t = time in years  
  α = labor share in GDP 
  L =  labor input each year 
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  K = capital input each year 
 
Equation (2):  MSt  = γ GDP  
  MSt = military spending in year t 
γ = proportion of GDP devoted to procurement of                 
equipment and construction 
 
Equation (3):  MKt =    π MSt + MKt-1 (1- δ) 
  MKt = military capital stock in year t 
  π = proportion of GDP devoted to military spending  
  δ = depreciation of military capital 
Equation (1) can also be expressed by taking logarithmic derivatives of the 
variables with respect to time.   
Equation (4):  Q. /Q =  τ + α (L./L) + (1−α)(Κ./Κ) 
This form is useful for the model and stipulates that the rate of growth in GDP is 
equal to the annual growth of total factor productivity (technology progress- τ) plus the 
rate of growth in employment multiplied by the share of labor income in GDP (α), plus 
the rate of growth in the capital stock multiplied by the share of capital income in GDP 
(1−α).  This output rate of growth can be applied to actual GDP data to model future 
trends.  The rate of growth of total factor productivity can be estimated from other known 
values in Equation (4).  The labor and capital income shares in the study are based on 
historical data and educated judgments.  RAND draws their data from a wide array of 
unclassified sources for individual nations including their published statistical yearbooks. 
For comparison between nations, estimates of gross domestic product (GDP) 
estimates are based on purchasing power parity (PPP) calculations rather than on 
19 
conversions at currency exchange rates.  PPP dollar estimates are calculated by applying 
standardized international dollar prices to a country's output of goods and services and 
are considered the best measure for international comparisons of GDP.  This calibration 
factor remained constant throughout the 20-year period of study and was derived from 
the CIA World Factbook (The CIA World Factbook, 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/fbhome.html) for the year 2000.  It should 
be noted that PPP is an estimate that is subject to error and variance itself but this figure 
is used as a best guess constant since it is easily assessable and can be compared to other 
nations easily.2  The study estimated the parameters using a variety of methods including 
historical data and educated forecasts. 
Alternative scenarios can be proposed by manipulating these key parameters to fit 
the scenario. For example alternative total factor productivity growth scenarios could 
model potential increases in technological capability or infrastructure.  The effects of 
these differing numbers would affect the ultimate GDP forecast. 
D.    SUMMARY 
  The RAND method seeks to meld traditional economic growth theory with 
quantitative and qualitative assumptions about the socio-economic environments of the 
respective countries into an integrated educated view of a possible future.  This technique 
bears some similarity to the Schwartz method of scenario building and presents national 
defense planners with a set of assumptions to frame future decisions.  RAND 
acknowledges the uncertain nature of the results but there is no attempt to quantity it in 
any way. 
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V.  PROPOSED METHOD 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis has discussed a number of techniques pertaining to developing a more 
complete picture of the strategic environment and its risks.  In particular the study 
focuses on the economy and the variables that drive it.  Its ultimate aim is developing 
ways to improve the mental models of defense planners.  They can then make more 
informed decisions about allocating resources in the uncertain environment in which they 
must operate.  This chapter will propose a methodology to properly assess the driving 
forces in the strategic situation and address the risks in the assumptions made.  It will 
extend the methodology developed by the RAND report to include a consideration of 
uncertainty to provide a measure of the distribution of outcomes within a scenario. 
B. ALTERNATIVE ECONOMIC SCENARIOS 
Peter Schwartz’s scenario building methodology proposes that a variety of 
scenarios be developed on the basis of key issues.  They should then be and fleshed out 
with the existing body of knowledge on the subject.   This thesis focuses on the economy, 
in which there are a host of driving factors and trends that must be considered. 
While there is a continuum of possible outcomes that can occur, the best way to 
develop the crucial insights needed is to look at a discrete set of circumstances.  In 
particular these circumstances should be a status quo, optimistic and pessimistic 
scenarios.  Each of these stories should be based on real world driving forces.  Examples 
of the key forces, which could be adjusted to reflect a scenario, might be the degree of 
technological growth, and of labor and capital employment.  Before the scenarios can be 
developed a great deal of research must be conducted to identify the key variables.  Once 
identified, they should be used to specify and define the scenario. 
C.   ECONOMETRIC FORECASTING WITH SIMULATION 
The first step in developing an econometric model is to capture the behavior of 
the GDP and defense budgets in a mathematical format.   As previously discussed, the 
Cobb Douglas Production Function is an adequate basis to model GDP over time.  The 
logarithmic derivative of this function yields a rate of growth of GDP and can be applied 
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to recent GDP and purchasing power parity data to produce comparable GDP numbers.  
The next step is to estimate a percentage of GDP spent on defense for the country.  This 
information can be derived from historical sources or defined by specific scenario events.  
Once this data is programmed into a spreadsheet, a large amount of output data can be 
produced.  One useful output for defense planner is a time series plot of both GDP and 
the estimated defense budget.   
The variables in this model can be manipulated to fit the assumptions of the 
various scenarios.   Major changes in total factor productivity growth or labor and capital 
share of GDP can reflect major changes in the economy, culture or military policy.  
These variables should then be carefully considered within the realm of historical 
experience and educated guessing based on the driving trends that have been previously 
identified. 
Once the respective scenarios have been modeled in the point estimate realm, the 
next step is to start the simulation process with the aim of identifying effects of key 
uncertainties.   Definition of the statistical distributions for each variable should be 
conducted after carefully evaluating historical performance and scenario assumptions.   
This requires a mixture of research and hypothesis to define these them.  For the status 
quo scenario the best method is to simply use historical economic means and standard 
deviations of the variable in question.  If there is an available mean and standard 
deviation then a normal distribution should be used for the cell.  If there is no notable 
trend in the data towards a mean then a uniform distribution should be used.  This option 
allows a spread of values to be evaluated with equal statistical likelihoods in the 
variables.  While these two distributions should suffice for most analyses, there are some 
other functions that might be useful.   Crystal Ball allows the design of a custom 
distribution based on historical data.  This is an interesting function but is not continuous 
and may be too tightly defined for the uncertainty of an economic model.  Perhaps a 
better technique to use with actual data is to employ a some software program to process 
the data and propose the best-fit statistical distribution.  Finally, a simple method that 
may be useful is the triangular distribution.  This function allows the planner to assign a 
most likely, optimistic and pessimistic range for the variable. 
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Once the model is built and tested, and the variables are defined, it is time to carry 
out the simulation.  The actual forecast variable and cell needs to be defined to begin the 
process.  Since the focus of this thesis is on long range economic planning, the year 2021 
will be the forecast date.  It is important to note that once the model is built it is relatively 
easy to change the forecast year and also the assumptions.  This gives the planner some 
flexibility to consider alternative approaches for varying time frames. 
The simulation should be run with a sufficient number of iterations so that the 
forecast distribution looks relatively smooth.  For the purposes of this model, 2000 
iterations seem to be adequate.  Once the simulation is complete there needs to be an 
analysis of the results.  Crystal Ball provides ample options for report generation.  Some 
useful formats are the summary statistics and the graphical frequency chart.  The planner 
can readily ascertain the relative probabilities of an economic result given the scenario 
from these reports.  These outputs can be compared between competing nations under a 
common scenario and conclusions drawn about military capabilities in future years.  The 
results and their uncertainties could easily be plotted on the same chart.   An example of 
an insight that could be drawn from such an analysis is: when will one country’s GDP (or 
defense spending) overtake another’s based on a set of assumptions.  This analysis might 
help define a long-term force structure based on relative economic strengths. 
D.   BAYESIAN PROBABILITY ANALYSIS 
Presbyterian minister Thomas Bayes introduced his theory of conditional 
probabilities in the 18th century.   The general form of Bayes law gives a conditional 
probability of an event A given another event B as follows: 
 
P(A|B) =  P(A|B) 
             P(B)         
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This formula can be mathematically manipulated into the following form that can be used 
to update prior probability distributions.   
P(A|B) =            P(B|A) P(A)                   (Where A* is the complement of A) 
           P(B|A) P(A) +  P(B|A*) P(A*) 
 
This technique called Bayesian analysis uses actual data and observations to produce a 
posterior probability distribution. This feature makes it an excellent tool to refine 
econometric models.  The posterior distribution that is calculated then acts as the prior 









For the purposes of this study, Bayesian Analysis can be used to evaluate and tune 
the models to reflect real world happenings.  Actual economic data could be compared to 
the scenarios so that a relative probability of which set of assumptions a planner is 
operating under can be evaluated. 
E.  SUMMARY 
The methodology presented in this chapter is designed to meld a variety of 
techniques and methodologies developed by economists, business people and defense 
planners to predicting a set of future results and determine the relative likelihood of these 
forecasts.  The Cobb Douglas production function was proposed to underpin the model of 
GDP for nations of interest.  A variety of research methods to obtain valid estimates for 
the variables in this equation were discussed.  Monte Carlo simulation methods are also 
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proposed to account for uncertainty in the model.  Finally, Bayesian posterior probability 
analysis was introduced as a tool for refining a models assumptions and providing 
insights to the planner as to which scenario is actually modeling the actual economic 
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VI. AN ANALYSIS OF THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
USING THE PROPOSED MODEL 
Although the United States will not face a peer competitor in the near 
future, the potential exists for regional powers to develop sufficient 
capabilities to threaten stability in regions critical to U.S. interests. In 
particular, Asia is gradually emerging as a region susceptible to large-
scale military competition. Along a broad arc of instability that stretches 
from the Middle East to Northeast Asia, the region contains a volatile mix 
of rising and declining regional powers.  
Quadrennial Defense Review Report.  2001 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter presented a methodology designed to study alternative 
scenarios of economic growth and defense spending with the aim of harvesting insights 
for military planners.  To illustrate this methodology the People’s Republic of China will 
be discussed.  This nation was chosen because of its recent surge in economic growth and 
military might and also because of its growing roll as a regional hegemon in the Pacific 
Rim.  Before the scenarios for the future can be introduced a brief review of China’s 
economic terrain is useful. 
B.   CHINA’S ECONOMIC KEY ISSUES 
China currently has the second largest economy in the world in terms of 
purchasing power parity behind the US.  Since 1978, the country’s leadership has begun a 
shift away from a stagnant Soviet-style economy to a more market-oriented system. The 
system is still highly controlled by the Communist leadership but there has been a notable 
trend towards empowering local officials and plant managers.  The results of this reform 
have lead to a quadrupling of GDP since 1978.  With an estimated 1.2 billion of 
population their GDP per capita figure is $3600 (PPP) in the year 2000.  This is dwarfed 
by the US figure that was $36,200 in the same year.  This indicates that their system is 
still inefficient and that there is likely great potential for future growth if the labor and 
28 
capital pool is better utilized (The CIA World Factbook, 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/fbhome.html). 
Much of the literature on the PRC identifies some keytrends that will likely affect 
their economy.  One of those issues is Western influence on the nation.  The reintegration 
of Hong Kong is cited as a major source of this influence as the prosperous province 
asserts itself as an important driver of the nation’s economy.  The prospect of a  peaceful 
reunification of Taiwan under a “one-China” umbrella is an event that might accelerate 
this process.  The rapidly expanding use of the Internet and wireless communications has 
provided a channel to the outside world unprecedented in the history of China.  If this 
trend accelerates, then the entire culture and fabric of the nation and the economy could 
be profoundly affected.  
The demography of China is of course extremely important to the future 
economic growth prospects of the nation.  The sheer weight of one fifth of the world’s 
population presents both burden and promise for the nation.  The “one child policy” the 
nation has been pursuing for the last couple of decades might become a problem if 
populations begin to become unsustainable as the ratio of males to females increases.  
(Oglivy, Schwartz, 2000, p. 42)  Being able to efficiently channel the labor potential of 
the populace is a key concern for Chinese economic leaders.   With increased 
communications, potential different demographic groups could possibly unite and 
become powerful entities in nation’s affairs. 
Another issue that has surfaced lately is the governments struggle to collect 
revenues due from provinces businesses and individuals.  The pool of resources available 
to the government will dwindle as a percentage of GDP if this problem is not mitigated 
significantly. (The CIA World Factbook, 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/fbhome.html) Availability of energy is 
another problem that China’s economic planners face in the near term.  Without an 
adequate domestic supply of clean-burning coal and petroleum, the nation is faced with a 
major obstacle in transitioning to a competitive modern economy.  A related problem is 
deterioration of the environment, notably air pollution, soil erosion and a reduction in the 
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water table.  While by no means exhaustive, these are the key drivers used in the scenario 
building exercise below.  
C.   ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS  
Development of scenarios about China’s future has been conducted by a variety 
of sources besides the RAND study.  The Office of Net Assessment, numerous academic 
institutions and the intelligence community have all conducted such exercises.  These 
respective studies have addressed numerous issues including those key drivers identified 
above.  This thesis will focused on three scenarios.  The first represents continued growth 
“status quo” of the Chinese economy.  The next scenario is an interrupted or suspended 
growth case as the nation struggles with cultural upheaval driven by some of the key 
socio-political problems previously identified.  The final, and most optimistic, scenario is 
accelerated growth where the efficiency of the labor and capital begins to catch up with 
levels found in the most advanced nations. 
D.   CONTINUED GROWTH SCENARIO 
The continued growth scenario is the status quo case.  It assumes no major events 
disrupt the current course that has been set for the economy.  This is the best scenario to 
start from in order to understand potential variances in the outcomes of other scenarios.  
It will rely on historical data for the variables and will provide a most likely estimate for 
the future as a baseline.  Through the use of simulation, a confidence limit around the 
forecasts will also be established.  
The economic data set used borrows heavily from the RAND Corporation work 
featuring a similar scenario and point estimates. (Wolfe, 2000)  There was no shift of the 
parameters and their distributions throughout the 20-year epoch in order to keep the 
context intact.  Cyclical variations are accounted for only in the distributions of the 
respective variables.  The GDP growth rates are also lower than that of recent years, 
which reflects a general slowdown of the world economy in the past year (2001). 
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The following parameters were used to populate the model to represent the scenario: 
 τ  − total factor productivity growth  Uniform DISTN (1-1.5%) 
 α − labor share in GDP  Normal DISTN (Mean 6% Std Dev- 3.35%) 
 (L./L) – rate of growth in employment  Normal DISTN (Mean 1% Std Dev- .7 %) 
 (K./K)  – rate of growth of capital  Uniform DISTN (8-9%) 
 γ  − proportion of GDP spent on defense  Uniform DISTN (2-3%) 
The model was run until 2021, which was chosen as the forecast year.  Results are 
presented in detail in Appendix A.  The 2021 GDP mean forecast result from was $12.94 
trillion in purchasing power parity (PPP)3.  The chart below is the Crystal Ball output for a 
GDP run with 2000 trials.  An 85% confidence level is displayed which ranges from $12.5 










A snapshot of the range of GDP growth rates of the simulation show that they vary 
between 3.68% and 6.91% but are centered near the 5.2% area.   
The simulation yielded the following results for total defense budget.  The 
distribution of outcomes appears less normal than that of GDP and has a mean value of 
$323.80 billion.   The outer confidence limits are $267.2 to $378.4, which is a fairly wide 
spread, possibly as an artifact of the assumptions in the simulation. 
  
                                                 
3Note: for the remainder of this chapter all forecasts are in purchasing power parity (PPP) to US 
dollars. 
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While the likelihood of all of the model’s parametric values remaining within the 
historical norms for the next 20 years might be fairly remote, this case provides baseline 
information to planners.  One insight from this analysis might indicate when (given this 
scenario) China’s GDP and military spending is comparable to that of the United States 
or other competitor nations.  The uncertainty statement could then be assessed.  This sort 
of analysis would also provide insight into the possibility of a future China becoming a 
peer competitor.  This could conceivably lead decision makers to explore alternative 
courses of action such as diplomacy or alliance.  Of course the same analysis should also 
be applied to other nations in the region.  
E.   SUSPENDED GROWTH SCENARIO 
This scenario reflects a major change occurring at about 2010.  Up to this point 
the model follows the continued growth scenario.  In fact, the same parameter values and 
their respective distributions were used for this period.  In the year 2010 a combination of 
negative developments severely disrupts China’s economic progress.   
Specifically, a major rift develops along demographic lines.  Spurred by the rapid 
proliferation of the Internet (to the chagrin of the established regime). Chinese interest 
groups have begun to organize.  These groups have differing objectives and opinions 
about the direction of their nation, but are united in distain for the repressive nature of the 
government.  One such group is the Falun Gong movement, which had been brutally 
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repressed for years.  Despite this resistance the group was able to recruit new members 
and generate a resistance network on the Internet.  Another is an increasingly militant 
movement of young, educated Chinese who are disenchanted with the stagnant nature of 
the communist party.  Having been witness to the huge gains in prosperity and lifestyle in 
other Asian and Western Nations, they demand the opportunities.  Realizing the 
effectiveness of the web for mobilization purposes, the Chinese government has cracked 
down, establishing a China-only intranet.  All web sites on this domain are thoroughly 
reviewed for political congruity and moral standards.  Outraged by this affront to their 
new found freedoms, younger Chinese wage a clandestine battle by word of mouth and 
secret channels of the net such as steganography (using images or video to hide text 
messages that can only be decrypted with a special key) to organize a resistance.  The 
first manifestation of the covert movement is a massive under reporting of income.  This 
is reflected in the model by percentage of GDP spent on defense since much of this 
money, normally due to the central government stays in the hands of the earners.   
Additionally, there are massive demonstrations throughout the nation.  The 
communist regime’s first reaction was to quash them in the same manner as Tianamin 
Square in 1989.  The PRC’s position in the World Trade Organization is threatened as 
several members including the US decry Chinese human rights abuses.  Instability caused 
by threats of foreign trade disruption has an adverse effect on total factor productivity 
growth labor and capital factors.  These problems cause the economy to stumble 
significantly for a 10-year period until 2021.   
The following parameters were used in the model to represent the scenario: 
 τ  − total factor productivity
growth 
 2001-2009: Uniform DISTN (1-1.5%) 
 2010-2021: Uniform DISTN (.8-1.1%) 
 α − labor share in GDP  2001-2021: Normal DISTN (Mean .6 Std Dev- 3.35) 
 (L./L) – rate of growth of
employment 
 2001-2009: Normal DISTN (Mean 1% Std Dev- .7 %)
 2010-2021: Normal DISTN (Mean .8% Std Dev-.5 %)
 (K./K)  – rate of growth of capital  2001-2009: Uniform DISTN (8-9%) 
 2010-2021:  Uniform DISTN (4-8%) 
 γ  − proportion of GDP spent on
defense 
 2001-2009: Uniform DISTN (2-3%) 
 2010-2021:  Uniform DISTN (1.5-2%) 
33 
 The resulting frequency chart for GDP in the forecast year of 2021 is presented 
below:   
The GDP is centered at $11.02 trillion and the 85% confidence limits hold the 
figure in the range of $10.6 to $11.4 trillion range.  Simulation results for defense budget 









The mean is $193.02 billion with 85% from 168.2 to 216.9.  A detailed report of these 
results is included in Appendix B. 
 Despite the assumptions about the parameters of the model being altered 
significantly downward, the economy still experiences fairly robust growth.  The ranges 
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of estimates provided by the model for GDP growth rate are between 2.9 to 4.6% (for the 
85% confidence level).  While this is significantly lower than the 8% rate of the year 
2000 the fact that the economy is growing despite the events is a powerful statement 
about its underlying strength.   
F. ACCELERATED GROWTH SCENARIO 
An accelerated growth case could be imagined where the inputs to the production 
function continue to improve.  Schwartz and Ogilvy referred to this as the “Singapore x 
70” scenario in their book entitled China’s Futures.  It describes a China that has become 
integrated, disciplined, efficient and benign, essentially Singapore many times bigger.  
(Ogilvy, Schwartz, 2000, p. 57) 
The year 2008 is the year that things come together.  Relations with the US have 
gradually warmed over the last seven years.  Shared interest in minimizing violent 
Islamic movements and terrorism set the scene for a series of agreements on diplomatic 
and economic relations being extended between the two nations.  Additionally, a new 
cultural movement is underway.  Young Chinese people who have been raised with 
Internet images of Western and Asian nation’s prosperity begin to come to power in 
industry and government.  The communist zeal is waning, as freedom and opportunity 
become the watchwords of the new generation, many of whom have been educated in 
abroad. 
After acceptance into the World Trade Organization in 2001, China has cultivated 
an extensive web of relationships with Western and Asian trade partners.  In 2010, after 
considerably reducing barriers to doing business, China was invited to join the 
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) by the residing members.  This 
renaissance in regional relations coincides with technological gains that serve to alleviate 
the energy supply problem and boost efficiency of labor and capital. 
This case required more manipulation of the data between the years to accurately 
reflect the nature of the scenario.  A detailed discussion of these data distributions is 
presented in Appendix C. 
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As presented in the following chart, the forecast GDP for in 2021 has the 
staggering mean of $17.68 trillion.  The uncertainty of this forecast within an 85% 









The growth rates that are reached under these conditions at the end of the 20-year epoch 
are between 7.5% and 9% a year.  The resulting defense budget forecasts range between  
$324.4 and $417.0 billion for the 85% confidence level and have a mean of  $371.85 























16,500.00 17,062.50 17,625.00 18,187.50 18,750.00
2,000 Trials    6 Outliers
Forecast: GDP 2021
Frequency Chart











275.00 318.75 362.50 406.25 450.00
2,000 Trials    0 Outliers
Forecast: Defense Budget-Accelerated Growth Scenar
36 
Evaluations of the results of this case present a compelling case for China to 
evolve to a true economic giant under very realistic assumptions.  This analysis might 
provide incentive to the nation to reform their antiquated system to a more modern and 
efficient one.  Their aims of being the rightful hegemon of the Pacific Rim would perhaps 
best be accomplished in this manner rather than the militaristic approach.  In this scenario 
there was a lesser proportion of GDP spent on defense but the resulting budget was much 
higher.  This balance between relative spending between defense and the private sector, 
highlight the opportunity costs faced with fielding a large military.  This lesson was 
learned the hard way by the Soviet Union in the 1980’s and is of key importance to 
leaders of all nations.  
G. SUMMARY AND SCENARIO COMPARISON 
This chapter has illustrated the model that was developed in this thesis by 
applying it to the PRC.  Three separate scenarios were chosen to represent a wide swath 
of realistic future possibilities.  They all rely on actual driving issues and trends that 
could affect China’s economic environment.  These scenarios were represented in the 
theoretical mathematical constraints of the Cobb Douglas Production Function.  Data and 
variance for the individual components of the model were chosen on the basis of 
historical data.  This data was manipulated within realistic constraints to reflect the events 
that were unfolding in the scenarios. 
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After fully evaluating these scenarios and the uncertainties surrounding them, it is 
useful to compare their main tenants.   The following chart highlights the differences in 
forecasted GDP in 2021 for the three cases.  





















High GDP Est Low GDP Est Mean GDP Est Low Range
High GDP Est 13.4 11.4 18.2
Low GDP Est 12.5 10.6 17.1
Mean GDP Est 12.94 11.02 17.68








From the chart it is apparent that there is no overlap at this point in the model.  Certainly 
this would not be the case in earlier years before the cases clearly diverged.  What is 
obvious however is the sheer difference in the numbers, which is literally trillions of 
dollars.  This difference captures the first key layer of uncertainty that defense planners 
must contend with when looking out at a timeframe of this length.  That is the uncertainty 
of possible outcomes.  The range of the estimates presented in the chart represent the 
second layer of uncertainty.  That is the potential variance in the model given the 
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The variances between the scenarios and within are once again highlighted.  These 
uncertainties are vital for the defense planner to fully comprehend.  They translate into 
large ranges of possibilities for procurement of weapons systems or operational 
deployments.  Through the development of these cases for the PRC the complexity of the 
task at hand for strategic planners is illustrated.  Armed with this method, the full arrays 
of possibilities are highlighted for these decision makers giving them an improved mental 
model of the economic environment that they are working in.  
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 VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A.   SUMMARY    
This study has evaluated a number of methods to aid the strategic planner in 
anticipating future developments.  The economy was selected as a key issue.  Means of 
effectively assessing the economic “terrain” and minimizing the risks of incorrect 
assumptions were identified.  Traditional econometric modeling has imposed complex 
mathematical techniques on an essentially chaotic system with the aim of trying to 
predict the future.  Despite their complexity and comprehensiveness, these models have 
never had much success.  The main problem is that they usually rely on past information 
and performance to predict the future.  Without the added depth of alternate scenarios, 
they provide a false sense of certainty about the future.  Phenomena such as technological 
booms, catastrophic events and non-traditional business cycles can be explored using 
varying with scenarios but are not easily synthesized with mathematical functions. 
The methodology presented in this paper combines econometric techniques with 
scenario building, risk analysis and Monte Carlo Simulation to provide a technique for 
defense planners that explicitly addresses two separate levels of uncertainty.  First the 
uncertainty of what major developments will unfold, and second, how much variance is 
likely should those events unfold.   
This technique, when used properly can provide value added in the form of 
insight and improved mental models of the world.  Armed with an extensive set of 
insights and knowledge the decision maker can attack the arduous task of constructing an 
effective military.  Although the focus of this study was on economics as a driving factor, 
the basic framework of the technique might be adapted to other key areas. 
The benefits of this combined methodology might be best described in terms of an 
analogy from perspective of military pilots (author’s occupation).  Use of simulation for 
training purposes has become an effective part of training aviators throughout their 
career.   Flight simulators allow scenarios such as severe emergencies, disrupted 
communications and poor weather to be played out without danger to the crew.  The use 
of multiple problem-solving techniques within these simulations is required for 
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successful completion.  A thoughtful review of what actions were taken and their 
consequences helps provide the crews feedback.  The aim of these exercises is to add to 
the experience and confidence of the crew.   Basically they improve the mental models of 
the aircrew.   
The analogy to the technique presented for defense planning is obvious.  Though 
this methodology the key issues that drive the problem can be evaluated from their 
conceptual roots to future possible outcomes within a descriptive model.  It is in many 
ways, a simulator for defense planners.  Their future abilities to react to changes in the 
economic situation are improved in the same way pilot’s abilities are enhance by 
encountering emergencies in the flight simulator.   
B.    INSIGHTS FROM THE PRC EXERCISE 
 While this study focused on the economy of the PRC independent of other 
nations, insights can be reaped from the process.  First the sheer size and potential of a 
modern China is illustrated in all three scenarios.  Even in the interrupted growth case the 
economy would grow at a substantial rate.  The accelerated growth case further illustrates 
this potential power.  The implications are obvious to the US.  The PRC has real potential 
to be a peer competitor in the coming decades.  Without substantial changes in the 
balance of power in the Pacific Rim, it is likely that the US position as a dominant 
regional force will diminish.  With these insights in mind, planners should construct 
defense forces to anticipate this possibility.   
C.  SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH  
While this study focused on the PRC to illustrate the proposed methods, it could 
obviously be applied to other nations.  Future studies might utilize this technique to study 
a certain geographical area with of interdependent scenarios.  One such area might be the 
Pacific Rim, since many believe that it will be a center for future growth as well as an 
area of competing interests and potential strife.  An evaluation of Middle East nation’s 
economic growth and military capability within the context of scenarios evaluating the 
effects of such as a gradually westernizing trends or a retreat to fundamentalism would be 
of value.  Scenarios in the European theater would also be valuable for future research.   
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Within these “stories of the future,” parameters and their respective statistical 
distributions can be adjusted as new trends emerge.  While it is impossible to cover the 
entire gamut of potential real world developments, emerging trends and driving forces 
can be applied to this model to ascertain the effects on power.   Additionally Bayesian 
posterior probability analysis could continuously refine and improve the models.  As 
always, the additional insights to the decision maker are the value added of the model. 
Additional layers of model complexity are another area where future research 
might be directed.  The RAND study that was introduced in Chapter IV examined 
estimates of military capital based on depreciation and procurement estimates.  The 
addition of this step to the model would provide a bottom line military force potential 
estimate.  This data could be incorporated into net assessments of force-on-force conflict.  
From this knowledge, better decisions about resource allocation could be made.   Also 
and examination of the empirical data and actual model performance in terms of variable 
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Continued Growth Scenario - Crystal Ball Report
Simulation started on 11/27/01 at 21:17:11
Simulation stopped on 11/27/01 at 21:20:53
Forecast:  Defense Budget 2021 Cell:  V19
Summary:
Certainty Level is 85.00%
Certainty Range is from 267.22 to 378.42  
Display Range is from 225.00 to 425.00 
Entire Range is from 248.09 to 413.38 














Mean Std. Error 0.86
Frequency Chart











225.00 275.00 325.00 375.00 425.00
2,000 Trials    0 Outliers





























































Forecast:  Growth Rate 2021 Cell:  V13
Summary:
Display Range is from 3.500% to 7.000% 
Entire Range is from 3.120% to 7.133% 


























3.500% 4.375% 5.250% 6.125% 7.000%
2,000 Trials    7 Outliers
























































Forecast:  GDP Cell:  V15
Summary:
Certainty Level is 85.00%
Certainty Range is from 12,518.04 to 13,366.59  
Display Range is from 12,000.00 to 13,750.00 
Entire Range is from 12,126.53 to 14,089.04 














Mean Std. Error 6.65
Frequency Chart
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Assumption:  t Cell:  B7
 Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 1.0%
Maximum 1.5%
Mean value in simulation was 1.2%
Assumption:  a Cell:  B9
 Normal distribution with parameters:
Mean 61.2%
Standard Dev. 3.4%
Selected range is from -Infinity to +Infinity
Mean value in simulation was 61.3%
Assumption:  (L./L) Cell:  B10
 Normal distribution with parameters:
Mean 1.0%
Standard Dev. 0.7%
Selected range is from -Infinity to +Infinity
Mean value in simulation was 1.0%
Assumption:  (K./K) Cell:  B11
 Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 8.0%
Maximum 9.0%
Mean value in simulation was 8.5%
Assumption:  g Cell:  B17
 Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 2.0%
Maximum 3.0%
Mean value in simulation was 2.5%
End of Assumptions
1.0% 1.1% 1.3% 1.4% 1.5%
t
51.1% 56.1% 61.2% 66.2% 71.2%
a
-1.1% -0.1% 1.0% 2.1% 3.1%
(L./L)
8.0% 8.3% 8.5% 8.8% 9.0%
(K./K)
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Suspended Growth Scenario - Crystal Ball Report
Simulation started on 11/27/01 at 20:17:52
Simulation stopped on 11/27/01 at 20:21:18
Forecast:  Defense Budget (PPP) Dissrupted Growth S Cell:  V19
Summary:
Certainty Level is 85.00%
Certainty Range is from 168.16 to 216.91  
Display Range is from 150.00 to 240.00 
Entire Range is from 157.52 to 231.67 














Mean Std. Error 0.37
Frequency Chart











150.00 172.50 195.00 217.50 240.00
2,000 Trials    0 Outliers






























Group Start Value End Value Prob. Freq.
-Infinity 150.00 0.000000 0
1 150.00 150.90 0.000000 0
2 150.90 151.80 0.000000 0
3 151.80 152.70 0.000000 0
4 152.70 153.60 0.000000 0
5 153.60 154.50 0.000000 0
6 154.50 155.40 0.000000 0
7 155.40 156.30 0.000000 0
8 156.30 157.20 0.000000 0
9 157.20 158.10 0.000500 1
10 158.10 159.00 0.002000 4
11 159.00 159.90 0.000000 0
12 159.90 160.80 0.002000 4
13 160.80 161.70 0.005000 10
14 161.70 162.60 0.004000 8
15 162.60 163.50 0.007000 14
16 163.50 164.40 0.005500 11
17 164.40 165.30 0.012500 25
18 165.30 166.20 0.010500 21
19 166.20 167.10 0.009000 18
20 167.10 168.00 0.010000 20
21 168.00 168.90 0.009000 18
22 168.90 169.80 0.015000 30
23 169.80 170.70 0.009500 19
24 170.70 171.60 0.014000 28
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Forecast:  Defense Budget (PPP) Dissrupted Growth S  (cont'd) Cell:  V19
Group Start Value End Value Prob. Freq.
25 171.60 172.50 0.014000 28
26 172.50 173.40 0.020500 41
27 173.40 174.30 0.015500 31
28 174.30 175.20 0.012500 25
29 175.20 176.10 0.012500 25
30 176.10 177.00 0.016500 33
31 177.00 177.90 0.015500 31
32 177.90 178.80 0.010500 21
33 178.80 179.70 0.021500 43
34 179.70 180.60 0.014500 29
35 180.60 181.50 0.020000 40
36 181.50 182.40 0.017500 35
37 182.40 183.30 0.016000 32
38 183.30 184.20 0.016500 33
39 184.20 185.10 0.019500 39
40 185.10 186.00 0.018000 36
41 186.00 186.90 0.018000 36
42 186.90 187.80 0.015000 30
43 187.80 188.70 0.017000 34
44 188.70 189.60 0.011500 23
45 189.60 190.50 0.015000 30
46 190.50 191.40 0.015500 31
47 191.40 192.30 0.013500 27
48 192.30 193.20 0.017500 35
49 193.20 194.10 0.015500 31
50 194.10 195.00 0.019500 39
51 195.00 195.90 0.014500 29
52 195.90 196.80 0.018500 37
53 196.80 197.70 0.018000 36
54 197.70 198.60 0.014000 28
55 198.60 199.50 0.010500 21
56 199.50 200.40 0.021500 43
57 200.40 201.30 0.015500 31
58 201.30 202.20 0.019000 38
59 202.20 203.10 0.014500 29
60 203.10 204.00 0.021500 43
61 204.00 204.90 0.014000 28
62 204.90 205.80 0.016500 33
63 205.80 206.70 0.011000 22
64 206.70 207.60 0.017500 35
65 207.60 208.50 0.017500 35
66 208.50 209.40 0.018000 36
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Forecast:  Defense Budget (PPP) Dissrupted Growth S  (cont'd) Cell:  V19
Group Start Value End Value Prob. Freq.
67 209.40 210.30 0.017500 35
68 210.30 211.20 0.018000 36
69 211.20 212.10 0.023000 46
70 212.10 213.00 0.017000 34
71 213.00 213.90 0.008500 17
72 213.90 214.80 0.009500 19
73 214.80 215.70 0.014500 29
74 215.70 216.60 0.012500 25
75 216.60 217.50 0.012500 25
76 217.50 218.40 0.014000 28
77 218.40 219.30 0.008500 17
78 219.30 220.20 0.009500 19
79 220.20 221.10 0.006500 13
80 221.10 222.00 0.008000 16
81 222.00 222.90 0.007000 14
82 222.90 223.80 0.004500 9
83 223.80 224.70 0.003500 7
84 224.70 225.60 0.002500 5
85 225.60 226.50 0.000500 1
86 226.50 227.40 0.003000 6
87 227.40 228.30 0.001000 2
88 228.30 229.20 0.001000 2
89 229.20 230.10 0.000000 0
90 230.10 231.00 0.000000 0
91 231.00 231.90 0.001000 2
92 231.90 232.80 0.000000 0
93 232.80 233.70 0.000000 0
94 233.70 234.60 0.000000 0
95 234.60 235.50 0.000000 0
96 235.50 236.40 0.000000 0
97 236.40 237.30 0.000000 0
98 237.30 238.20 0.000000 0
99 238.20 239.10 0.000000 0
100 239.10 240.00 0.000000 0
240.00 +Infinity 0.000000 0
Total: 1.000000 2000
Cumulative:
Group Start Value End Value Prob. Freq.
-Infinity 150.00 0.000000 0
1 150.00 150.90 0.000000 0
2 150.90 151.80 0.000000 0
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Forecast:  2001 Ra te  of Growth Ce ll:  V13
Summary:
Certainty Level is 85.00%
Certainty Range is from 2.915% to 4.610%  
Display Range is from 2.000% to 5.500% 
Entire Range is from 2.158% to 5.530% 














Mean Std. Error 0.013%
Frequency Chart











2.000% 2.875% 3.750% 4.625% 5.500%
2,000 Trials    2 Outliers
Forecast: 2001 Rate of Growth
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Forecast:  GDP Ce ll:  V15
Summary:
Certainty Level is 85.00%
Certainty Range is from 10,642.27 to 11,402.61  
Display Range is from 10,250.00 to 11,750.00 
Entire Range is from 10,069.19 to 11,840.23 














Mean Std. Error 5.90
Frequency Chart











10,250.00 10,625.00 11,000.00 11,375.00 11,750.00
2,000 Trials    9 Outliers
Forecast: GDP
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Assumption:  t Ce ll:  B7
 Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 1.0%
Maximum 1.5%
Mean value in simulation was 1.2%
Assumption:  a Ce ll:  B9
 Normal distribution with parameters:
Mean 61.2%
Standard Dev. 3.4%
Selected range is from -Infinity to +Infinity
Mean value in simulation was 61.3%
Assumption:  (L./L) Ce ll:  B10
 Normal distribution with parameters:
Mean 1.0%
Standard Dev. 0.7%
Selected range is from -Infinity to +Infinity
Mean value in simulation was 1.0%
Assumption:  (K./K) Ce ll:  B11
 Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 8.0%
Maximum 9.0%
Mean value in simulation was 8.5%
1.0 % 1.1 % 1.3% 1.4% 1.5 %
t
5 1.1 % 5 6.1 % 6 1.2 % 6 6.2 % 7 1.2 %
a
- 1.1 % - 0.1 % 1.0% 2.1% 3.1 %
(L./L)
8.0 % 8.3 % 8.5% 8.8% 9.0 %
(K./K)
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Assumption:  g Ce ll:  B17
 Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 2.0%
Maximum 3.0%
Mean value in simulation was 2.5%
Assumption:  V7 Ce ll:  V7
 Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 0.8%
Maximum 1.1%
Mean value in simulation was 0.9%
Assumption:  V9 Ce ll:  V9
 Normal distribution with parameters:
Mean 61.2%
Standard Dev. 3.4%
Selected range is from -Infinity to +Infinity
Mean value in simulation was 61.0%
Assumption:  V10 Ce ll:  V10
 Normal distribution with parameters:
Mean 0.8%
Standard Dev. 0.5%
Selected range is from -Infinity to +Infinity
Mean value in simulation was 0.8%
2.0 % 2.3 % 2.5% 2.8% 3.0 %
g
0.8 % 0.9 % 1.0% 1.0% 1.1 %
V7
5 1.1 % 5 6.1 % 6 1.2 % 6 6.2 % 7 1.2 %
V9
- 0.7 % 0.1 % 0.8% 1.6% 2.3 %
V10
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Assumption:  V11 Ce ll:  V11
 Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 4.0%
Maximum 8.0%
Mean value in simulation was 6.0%
Assumption:  V17 Ce ll:  V17
 Uniform distribution with parameters:
Minimum 1.5%
Maximum 2.0%
Mean value in simulation was 1.8%
End of Assumptions
4.0 % 5.0 % 6.0% 7.0% 8.0 %
V11
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APPENDIX C.  ACCELERATED GROWTH SCENARIO DATA  
In order to represent the importance of the technological growth in this scenario, 
discrete values of total factor productivity (τ ) were chosen for this model.  Their value 













A normal distribution with a Mean of 60% and a standard deviation of 3.35% was used 
for labor share in GDP.   The rate of growth of employment (L./L) was modeled with 
normal distributions with means summarized in the following chart.  (Standard deviation 












Rate of growth of capital (K./K) was kept at the same level of prior simulations 
until 2009 where it was shifted slightly upwards to a uniform distribution ranging 
between 9 and 10%.  This change reflects the increased willingness of the international 
community to invest in the nation as it begins to open up.  Finally, the proportion of GDP 
spent on defense (γ) was represented with uniform distributions of 2-3% for the period of 
2001-2007.  As a result of the growing GDP and increased harmonious relationships in 




APPENDIX D.  ACCELERATED GROWTH SCENARIO REPORT 
 
Accera te d Growth Scena rio - Crysta l Ba ll Re port
Simulation started on 11/29/01 at 22:25:48
Simulation stopped on 11/29/01 at 22:28:44
Fore cast:  De fense  Budget-Acce le ra ted Growth Sce nar Ce ll:  V19
Summary:
Certainty Level is 85.00%
Certainty Range is from 324.38 to 417.03  
Display Range is from 275.00 to 450.00 
Entire Range is from 299.22 to 445.45 














Mean Std. Error 0.71
Frequency Chart











275.00 318.75 362.50 406.25 450.00
2,000 Trials    0 Out liers
Forecast : Defense Budget-Accelerated Growth Scenar
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Fore cast:  Ra te  of Growth Ce ll:  V13
Summary:
Certainty Level is 85.00%
Certainty Range is from 7.421% to 8.912%  
Display Range is from 6.750% to 9.750% 
Entire Range is from 6.287% to 9.827% 














Mean Std. Error 0.011%
Frequency Chart











6.75 0% 7.50 0% 8.25 0% 9.00 0% 9.75 0%
2,000 Trials    10 Outliers
Forecast : Rate of Growth
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Fore cast:  GDP 2021 Ce ll:  V15
Summary:
Certainty Level is 85.00%
Certainty Range is from 17,130.15 to 18,281.68  
Display Range is from 16,500.00 to 18,750.00 
Entire Range is from 16,297.39 to 18,849.54 














Mean Std. Error 8.80
Frequency Chart











16, 500.00 17, 062.50 17, 625.00 18, 187.50 18, 750.00
2,000 Trials    6 Out liers
Forecast: GDP 2021
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